Institutions Are Not the Order
Why the rules-based international order cannot be understood only as a set of institutions detached from the power that sustained them.
Model & Argument · Initial edition, November 2026
Debates about the decline of the so-called rules-based international order sometimes describe international institutions as though they were the cause of stability. But a rule is not self-enforcing, and an institution cannot exercise authority without the material and political conditions that make compliance possible.
The proposed correction is simple: the order was not just its institutional furniture.
Enforcement and consent
Treaties, financial arrangements, legal institutions and diplomatic conventions work because powerful actors find it useful to comply, because their partners provide mutual benefits, and sometimes because punishment for noncompliance is credible.
American power played an exceptional role in maintaining these conditions after the Second World War, particularly after the Cold War. That doesn't imply that the United States was always fair or that smaller states had no agency. It means that the institutional system and the underlying distribution of power must be analysed together.
What happens when the sponsor retreats?
Institutions can persist as names, buildings and procedures even while their operating assumptions change. They may become arenas for bargaining rather than mechanisms capable of settling disputes. Alternatively, new coalitions may sustain them, adapt them or build alternatives.
The appearance of continuity is therefore not the same as the continuation of the old order.
Avoiding two mistakes
The first mistake is institutional idealism: assuming that maintaining formal structures is sufficient to recreate an absent geopolitical settlement.
The second is excessive realism: assuming that norms and cooperation never matter. They do matter, and they can sometimes outlive changes in power precisely because participants see continuing value in them.
We should investigate which arrangements remain effective without American dominance, which depend on American enforcement, and which can be remade through regional cooperation.
This links US retreat to the more contingent multipolarity hypothesis.