{"path":"/world-in-transition/china/industrial-success-europe-competitiveness","content":{"title":"China's Industrial Success and Europe's Competitiveness Crisis","summary":"Why subsidies, overcapacity and structural stagnation are all part of the same story: China's manufacturing ecosystem and Europe's competitiveness challenge.","body":"*Why subsidies, overcapacity and structural stagnation are all part of the same story.*\n\n*Expanded evidence-based response to Zhou Xiaoming's [South China Morning Post opinion article](https://www.scmp.com/opinion/world-opinion/article/3373980/eus-fixation-chinese-subsidies-masks-its-own-structural-stagnation), 14 November 2026.*\n\n## Introduction: The wrong question about China's industrial rise\n\nChina has moved from low-cost manufacturing into electric vehicles, batteries, solar panels, advanced machinery and many other sophisticated products. Europe frequently explains its difficulty competing with Chinese firms by pointing to state subsidies and industrial overcapacity.\n\nThat explanation contains truth. Chinese policy has directed enormous resources toward strategic sectors, and some now exhibit excessive capacity and severe losses. But it is incomplete. **Europe's competitive weaknesses cannot be explained primarily by Chinese subsidies**, because many predate China's rise: fragmented markets, inadequate scale-up finance, weak digital-platform development, high industrial energy costs and slower adaptation to technological change.\n\nThe deeper question is how industrial capabilities accumulate. Competitiveness does not simply depend on what a government pays an individual firm; it depends on an entire system of suppliers, skilled workers, infrastructure, customers, production experience and technology.\n\n## 1. The subsidy estimates are less certain than they appear\n\nThe [OECD's 2026 MAGIC study](https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-magic-database-of-industrial-subsidies_ce94f33b-en/full-report.html) of 525 manufacturers across 15 sectors estimated that Chinese companies received three to eight times the industrial support given to companies in OECD economies, and that subsidies could explain almost 60% of Chinese firms' market-share gains in its sample.\n\n[Nicholas Lardy of the Peterson Institute](https://www.piie.com/publications/policy-briefs/2026/estimating-industrial-policy-subsidies-china) challenged an important part of its method in October 2026: the calculation of preferential lending. The OECD benchmarks American and European borrowing against wholesale market rates such as SOFR and Euribor, while Chinese borrowing is compared with China's one-year loan prime rate rather than the more comparable Shanghai Interbank Offered Rate, SHIBOR.\n\nLardy finds that the Chinese benchmark averaged about **1.2 percentage points higher** than SHIBOR over his comparison period. This means ordinary lending can appear subsidised simply because the benchmark is too high. Given that discounted credit constitutes much of the OECD's reported support, this is a material problem. Lardy notes that about 45% of new general Chinese loans carried rates below the loan prime rate in late 2024: hardly proof that all such loans were subsidised.\n\nBecause the underlying company-level data were not published, the magnitude of the resulting bias cannot be fully recalculated independently. **Lardy's critique supports scepticism about the OECD's headline numbers, not the conclusion that Chinese subsidies are negligible.**\n\n## 2. The IMF also finds substantial industrial policy support\n\nAn [IMF working paper published in August 2025](https://www.imf.org/en/publications/wp/issues/2025/08/07/industrial-policy-in-china-quantification-and-impact-on-misallocation-568888) estimates the annual fiscal equivalent of major Chinese industrial policy instruments at about **4% of GDP**, counting direct grants, tax concessions, preferential finance and subsidised land. Its scope differs from the OECD's, so the estimates are not directly interchangeable; Lardy also questions how the IMF extrapolates observations on listed firms to unlisted companies.\n\nThe IMF estimates that industrial-policy-related misallocation reduces Chinese aggregate total factor productivity by about 1.2%, with a GDP cost of up to 2%. An industrial policy can therefore build a world-class battery sector while also funding redundant plants and unproductive ventures.\n\nThe useful questions are whether support builds capabilities that persist after it ends, whether benefits outweigh costs, and whether unsuccessful investments are permitted to fail.\n\n## 3. Comparing China with America is difficult\n\n[Lardy cites World Bank estimates](https://www.piie.com/publications/policy-briefs/2026/estimating-industrial-policy-subsidies-china) of direct US budgetary support to firms averaging 2.1% of GDP in 2020–2022, versus approximately 2% of GDP for a comparable IMF category in China in 2023. Different years and methodologies prevent a definitive comparison.\n\nBoth governments intervene extensively, though through different systems: American tax incentives, research grants, procurement and state programmes; Chinese policy-bank credit, investment funds, grants, tax breaks, subsidised land and local-government support.\n\nThe original opinion article's per-capita comparison is weak. A billion-dollar subsidy to a semiconductor factory has the same immediate significance for that factory regardless of the home country's population. Support relative to an industry's investment, output or sales is a much more meaningful metric.\n\nThe defensible conclusion is that subsidies are widespread and measurements remain imperfect; confident claims about exactly how many times more China subsidises than its peers should be treated cautiously.\n\n## 4. China's manufacturing ecosystem is the deeper advantage\n\nUNIDO estimates China's share of global manufacturing value added at about **32% in 2024**, compared with around 6% in 2000. [OECD research released in November 2026](https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/economic-security-in-global-production_c1fe5fb3-en/full-report.html) finds that China led 14 of 18 manufacturing industries by value added in 2024, versus none in 2000. China had become the largest foreign supplier in approximately 40% of the examined country-industry relationships, up from about 4%.\n\nThese are not simply measures of factory size. A dense industrial ecosystem brings together specialised suppliers, materials processors, logistics, engineering expertise, machinery makers and large customer markets. Firms learn from repeated production, suppliers improve with scale, and skilled employees circulate through the system. The resulting network creates self-reinforcing productivity advantages.\n\n**Industrial competitiveness is a property of the productive ecosystem, not merely a collection of subsidised companies.**\n\nA subsidy might make building an individual battery factory attractive in Europe, but it cannot immediately reproduce the accumulated skills and supplier networks that allow a mature Chinese factory to operate efficiently. Some of those advantages were made possible by earlier state policy, yet the resulting capabilities are genuine and may survive without continuing subsidies.\n\n## 5. Electric vehicles: policy helped produce real efficiency\n\nAn [October 2026 AlixPartners analysis](https://www.alixpartners.com/newsroom/press-release-can-europe-still-build-cars-into-the-2030s/) estimated manufacturing costs of about **US$20,000** for a Chinese-branded EV versus **US$31,000** for a comparable European vehicle—a difference of roughly 35%. The [IEA independently identifies](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2026) substantial Chinese battery cost advantages.\n\nChina accounts for more than 80% of global battery cell output, roughly 85% of cathode active material production and over 90% of anode active material production, on [the IEA's 2025 figures](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2026). Lithium iron phosphate chemistry, automation, yields, supply integration and engineering experience all contribute. The IEA estimates that manufacturing efficiency explains more than 40% of the battery production-cost gap between China and Europe.\n\nBut these genuine advantages did not emerge without support. [Scott Kennedy of CSIS](https://www.csis.org/blogs/trustee-china-hand/chinese-ev-dilemma-subsidized-yet-striking) estimates **US$231 billion** in Chinese EV-sector support between 2009 and 2023. Purchase incentives, tax exemptions, research funding and charging networks helped create demand and production scale.\n\nThe sequence matters: policy encouraged early adoption; larger markets fostered specialisation and industrial learning; intense domestic competition forced manufacturers to improve and lower costs. Many firms failed. Subsidies and productivity are therefore not competing explanations: **policy helped create the conditions in which genuine competitive capabilities developed.**\n\n## 6. Overcapacity is real, particularly in solar\n\nThe claim that industrial overcapacity is just a Western invention does not withstand scrutiny. The [IEA's November 2026 *Renewables 2026* report](https://www.iea.org/reports/renewables-2026) finds that **over 90% of major Chinese solar PV manufacturers reported losses in 2026**, while more than 70 companies had entered bankruptcy or liquidation since 2024. A [March 2026 European Parliament study](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EXPO_STU%282026%29783610) also documents excess capacity across several industrial sectors.\n\nSome overcapacity is normal in expanding industries: investment overshoots demand and weak firms exit. A more persistent problem develops when preferential credit or local-government intervention keeps economically unviable production operating.\n\nCheap Chinese solar equipment has helped accelerate renewable deployment worldwide. At the same time, sustained losses and capacity concentration can undermine alternative supply chains and industrial resilience. Both truths matter. Overcapacity is not proof that China's industrial success is artificial, but neither should it be denied.\n\n## 7. The trade deficit is not a diagnosis\n\n[Eurostat records EU imports from China](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20260410-2) of approximately **€559.4 billion** in 2025 and exports of roughly **€199.6 billion**, producing a goods deficit near **€359.8 billion**. It is misleading to call this an unqualified record: the nominal deficit was larger in 2022, around €397 billion.\n\nA bilateral trade deficit reflects demand, supply chains, comparative advantage, savings and investment, exchange rates and policies. It does not, on its own, demonstrate unfair subsidisation.\n\nEurope buys Chinese goods partly because China is an extraordinarily competitive producer. Yet China's investment-heavy economic model, weak household demand and property-sector difficulties have encouraged reliance on foreign markets. The [IMF identifies this imbalance](https://www.imf.org/en/publications/cr/issues/2026/02/17/peoples-republic-of-china-2025-article-iv-consultation-press-release-staff-report-and-574028) as a genuine issue. China has reasons to stimulate domestic consumption; Europe has reasons to be concerned about distortions. Neither fact suggests tariffs would solve Europe's productivity problems.\n\n## 8. China leads in research, but ASPI is not measuring everything\n\nZhou accurately cites [ASPI's Critical Technology Tracker](https://www.aspi.org.au/programs/critical-technology-tracker/): China ranks first in highly cited research across **69 of 74 tracked technologies** in the 2026 update. It is a striking indicator of the breadth of Chinese scientific capability.\n\nHowever, ASPI primarily measures the national origin of the top 10% of influential papers in each field. This is not the same as dominance of all deployable technologies or commercial markets. The US retains major strengths in frontier computing, chip design and software platforms; Europe retains critical positions in precision machinery, industrial systems, scientific instruments, pharmaceuticals and lithography equipment.\n\nStill, Chinese leadership in so much high-impact research is difficult to reconcile with the suggestion that its international competitiveness is merely purchased with subsidies.\n\n## 9. Europe's structural weaknesses are well documented\n\nMario Draghi's 2024 European competitiveness report identified an innovation gap, insufficient investment and failures of industrial adaptation. The [Commission's 2026 assessment](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2026:46:FIN) places EU productivity per hour, adjusted for purchasing power, at about **78.5% of the US level** in 2024.\n\nFragmented national legal, tax, regulatory and capital markets constrain company growth. The [ECB estimates US-based venture capital funds](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/economic-bulletin/focus/2026/html/ecb.ebbox202605_01~4453cc2a34.pt.html) at around **€930 billion**, compared with roughly **€150 billion** in the EU. The [EIB finds real EU corporate investment](https://www.eib.org/en/publications/20250379-investment-report-2025) only around 1% above its pre-pandemic level by mid-2025, versus roughly 21% growth in the US.\n\nEnergy costs compound these difficulties. The IEA estimates that electricity prices for energy-intensive European industries in 2025 were around twice US levels and more than 50% higher than Chinese levels.\n\nTariffs cannot integrate European capital markets, create new digital technology companies, improve investment or lower electricity costs. These problems are fundamentally domestic.\n\n## 10. Europe still has formidable technological strengths\n\nCalling Europe a technologically stagnant region misses important distinctions. The Dutch company ASML is the sole commercial supplier of extreme ultraviolet lithography equipment for frontier semiconductors. European firms remain important in industrial machinery, automation, precision engineering, pharmaceuticals and scientific instruments.\n\n[Eurostat reports an EU high-tech goods trade surplus](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20261006-3) of roughly **€32.4 billion in 2025** and a 2.9% rebound in industrial production that year. EU-headquartered businesses account for about 16% of R&D among the world's 2,000 largest corporate research investors, according to [the Commission's industrial R&D scoreboard](https://knowledge-for-policy.ec.europa.eu/publication/2025-eu-industrial-rd-investment-scoreboard-0_en).\n\nThe real weakness is Europe's difficulty converting research and established industrial strengths into new globally scaled industries, particularly as software, batteries, electronics and digital platforms replace older sources of advantage. In automobiles, expertise in combustion engines and conventional manufacturing cannot by itself guarantee leadership in electric vehicles.\n\n## 11. Subsidy complaints must be consistent\n\nThe [European Commission records](https://commission.europa.eu/topics/competition/state-aid_en) about **€168 billion** in EU member-state aid in 2024, roughly 0.94% of GDP. US companies also receive extensive public support through tax advantages, procurement, research spending and industrial programmes.\n\nThis does not mean all intervention is equivalent: a broad research incentive, an export-contingent payment and an opaque preferential loan may have very different effects and legal treatment. Subsidies should be assessed by design, transparency, effects and applicable international obligations, not by the nationality of the government involved.\n\nAgriculture illustrates the danger of selective comparisons. The [OECD's 2026 report](https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/agricultural-policy-monitoring-and-evaluation-2026_2c7f3be1-en.html) estimates producer support in 2025 at approximately US$120 billion in the EU, US$53 billion in the US and US$304 billion in China. These include market-price support and are not directly comparable to cash industrial subsidies, but show that protection is hardly exclusive to the West.\n\n## 12. Tariffs can buy time but cannot create productivity\n\nThe EU's 2024 investigation concluded that Chinese battery EVs benefited from unfair subsidies, leading to manufacturer-specific additional duties ranging from 7.8% for Tesla to 35.3% for SAIC and certain others. [WTO rules permit properly investigated countervailing duties](https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/subs_e.htm); not every trade remedy is protectionist or unlawful.\n\nThe concern is an escalation from targeted remedies to broad exclusion. French and German proposals in October 2026 for stronger trade instruments raise important questions about evidence, proportionality and compatibility with existing obligations.\n\nTariffs may prevent abrupt industrial disruption or preserve strategic production while firms restructure. But this only works if the protected industry invests, upgrades technology and improves efficiency. Otherwise protection raises costs while postponing adaptation.\n\nSupply-chain security is also a legitimate separate objective. Diversification may be worth paying for even when Chinese imports are produced fairly and efficiently. Policymakers should state that rationale openly instead of conflating security with alleged unfair pricing.\n\n## 13. A credible European strategy begins at home\n\nEurope needs to deepen its single market in capital, digital services and commerce so firms can scale across the continent. European savings must be mobilised for productive growth investment, while energy generation, networks and storage need investment that reduces industrial electricity costs.\n\nIts established manufacturers must integrate software, automation, electronics, batteries, robotics and AI. Subsidies should help address clear market failures and build emerging capabilities, not indefinitely sustain uncompetitive incumbents. Trade measures should be targeted and evidence-based, while resilience policies should be clearly identified as such.\n\nChina also needs reforms: stronger household consumption, fewer incentives for redundant investment, better subsidy transparency and a willingness to let unsuccessful firms exit. Such measures would serve its own economic sustainability and reduce external tensions.\n\n## Conclusion: Competitiveness cannot be imported through tariffs\n\nChina's manufacturing transformation combines state intervention with genuine productive scale, supplier density, technical skill, research and fierce competition. Industrial policy has fostered capabilities—and caused inefficient investment and overcapacity.\n\nEurope's competitive problems are likewise real and multi-causal. Foreign subsidies warrant investigation and sometimes proportionate remedies, but Europe's fragmented markets, costly energy, weak scale-up finance and technological adaptation problems demand solutions within Europe.\n\n**The decisive competition is not between governments' subsidy budgets. It is between the productive systems that governments, businesses and societies have created.**\n\nThe question is not simply whether Europe can protect its existing industrial structure, but whether it can create the structure it needs next.\n\n## Related reading\n\nThe wider argument is developed in [China's Material Advantage](/world-in-transition/china/chinas-material-advantage), which examines the accumulated capabilities behind industrial scale. For a detailed sector comparison, read [The Global Semiconductor Race](/world-in-transition/ai-and-robotics/global-semiconductor-race).\n\nThe countervailing pressures are explored in [The Changing Geography of Production](/corollaries-of-the-five-pillars/deglobalisation/the-changing-geography-of-production), while [Industrial Renewal in a Multipolar World](/australia-in-transition/industrial-renewal) considers the practical implications for Australia.\n\n---\n\n## References and further reading\n\n1. [Zhou Xiaoming, *EU's fixation on Chinese subsidies masks its own structural stagnation*](https://www.scmp.com/opinion/world-opinion/article/3373980/eus-fixation-chinese-subsidies-masks-its-own-structural-stagnation), SCMP, 14 November 2026.\n2. [Nicholas R. Lardy, *Estimating Industrial Policy Subsidies in China*](https://www.piie.com/publications/policy-briefs/2026/estimating-industrial-policy-subsidies-china), PIIE, October 2026.\n3. [OECD, *MAGIC Database of Industrial Subsidies*](https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-magic-database-of-industrial-subsidies_ce94f33b-en/full-report.html), 2026.\n4. [Garcia-Macia, Kothari and Tao, *Industrial Policy in China*](https://www.imf.org/en/publications/wp/issues/2025/08/07/industrial-policy-in-china-quantification-and-impact-on-misallocation-568888), IMF, 2025.\n5. [IMF, *China: 2025 Article IV Consultation*](https://www.imf.org/en/publications/cr/issues/2026/02/17/peoples-republic-of-china-2025-article-iv-consultation-press-release-staff-report-and-574028), February 2026.\n6. [OECD, *Economic Security in Global Production*](https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/economic-security-in-global-production_c1fe5fb3-en/full-report.html), November 2026.\n7. [IEA, *Global EV Outlook 2026*](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2026), 2026.\n8. [IEA, *Renewables 2026*](https://www.iea.org/reports/renewables-2026), November 2026.\n9. [Scott Kennedy, *The Chinese EV Dilemma: Subsidized Yet Striking*](https://www.csis.org/blogs/trustee-china-hand/chinese-ev-dilemma-subsidized-yet-striking), CSIS, 2024.\n10. [ASPI, *Critical Technology Tracker*](https://www.aspi.org.au/programs/critical-technology-tracker/), 2026.\n11. [European Parliament, *Industrial Overcapacities, with a Focus on China*](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EXPO_STU%282026%29783610), March 2026.\n12. [European Commission, *Single Market and Competitiveness Report*](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2026:46:FIN), 2026.\n13. [ECB, *Europe's Venture Capital Gap*](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/economic-bulletin/focus/2026/html/ecb.ebbox202605_01~4453cc2a34.pt.html), 2026.\n14. [EIB, *Investment Report 2025/2026*](https://www.eib.org/en/publications/20250379-investment-report-2025), 2026.\n15. [European Commission, *EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard*](https://knowledge-for-policy.ec.europa.eu/publication/2025-eu-industrial-rd-investment-scoreboard-0_en), 2025.\n16. [Eurostat, *China trade*](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20260410-2) and [*High-tech trade*](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20261006-3), 2026.\n17. [OECD, *Agricultural Policy Monitoring and Evaluation 2026*](https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/agricultural-policy-monitoring-and-evaluation-2026_2c7f3be1-en.html).\n18. [WTO, *Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures*](https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/subs_e.htm).\n19. [European Commission, *State Aid*](https://commission.europa.eu/topics/competition/state-aid_en).\n20. [AlixPartners, *Can Europe Still Build Cars into the 2030s?*](https://www.alixpartners.com/newsroom/press-release-can-europe-still-build-cars-into-the-2030s/), October 2026.","author":"Emlyn O'Regan","social_description":"Why China's industrial success is more than subsidies, and why Europe cannot solve its competitiveness crisis with tariffs alone.","hero":"01a1da06-1912-7749-83a8-6d2575a98451","media":[{"asset_id":"01a1da06-1912-7749-83a8-6d2575a98451","alt":"Cinematic panorama of a connected industrial manufacturing ecosystem with robotic assembly lines, electric vehicles, battery cells, solar panels, wind power, shipping terminals and an older European industrial city at sunset."}]}}